An Expedient Mind: FREE WILL

AN EXPEDIENT MIND

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FREE WILL

"When I can do what I want to do, there is my liberty for me," wrote Voltaire, "but I can't help wanting what I do want."

That quotation puts all arguments about free will into a nutshell. The problem, in my view, is not really a problem at all. It is just an unfortunate side-effect, generated of the insistence by some, that a person's identity (and of what that person wants) is in some way separate from the mechanism of that person's brain.
If we do not insist on that separation, then there is no problem. We can, as it were, have our free will, and eat it. The materialist view is that the mechanism is the person. We could therefore speak of the "person/mechanism". By lumping the two terms together like that we make clear that they are just two terms for exactly the same thing. The person/mechanism takes all decisions. There is no way the buck can be passed elsewhere. The person/mechanism may be influenced by external events, but it is not controlled by any outside event. In that sense the person/mechanism is free to take any alternative decision. In some circumstances, such as when a person refuses to reveal information under torture, that could mean choosing to suffer dire consequences. Nevertheless, the choice to speak or not to speak is still open to a torture victim. That is not the case if a man is unable to take a walk in the woods because he is locked in a prison cell.
But if we take the view that a person's identity and the mechanism of that person's brain, are two separate entities, then the concept of free will is a problem. In these circumstances, if the brain mechanism takes a decision, then the mechanism has in effect taken the decision without the consent of the person. And if we insist that the mechanism is "external" to the individual, then the person is under the control of external (brain mechanism) events, and free will vanishes. That is not a comfortable idea for those who insist that each person is responsible for their own actions.
And that about wraps it up. I do not think it is reasonable to expect a long discourse on the concept of free will from someone, like myself, who does not believe it is problematic. Nor do I think it incumbent upon me that I provide an explanation of how God can simultaneously provide humans with free will, and still be able to know with certainty the future consequence of every event. Theo-babble is not my preferred mode of discourse.
The reason why many find the materialist view repugnant is because they have the (mistaken) idea that it implies that all human actions are predetermined, and therefore no blame or responsibility should be associated with any action. As I say, I think that view is mistaken. My reasons for that view are explained in the section entitled PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM.
Free will is a useful concept when we want to consider how much blame should be attached to the actions a person may carry out. And that in turn is an important consideration in any system of justice or social control. These concepts will be discussed later when we consider how we can represent the meannings of the words "justice" and "society". Briefly, we can distinguish between completely free decisions, and those made under duress. The torture victim may have the freedom to defy the torturers, but I do not think any one would reasonably suggest that the influence of torture does not lessen the responsibility which the person has for actions taken as a result. We can recognise coersion as a justification, without surrendering free will all together. There are, I suggest, degrees of freedom.

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