CHAPTER 14
Conceptual Dependencies
14.1 The Theory of Conceptual Dependencies
The theory of conceptual dependencies has been influential, and has been used as the foundation
for a number of interesting systems which have achieved a limited measure of success.
Although it has an ad hoc flavour which is philosophically unsatisfactory, it addresses
important questions of meaning and interpretation which have largely been avoided by many other NL systems.
The theory is based upon the idea that the meaning of statements can be analysed in terms of
three basic types of mental construct. These are acts, picture producers (PP), and states.
These three constructs are the building bricks of the theory. They are combined to produce
structures known as 'conceptualisations' and the relationships between the various components
are called 'conceptual dependencies'. We shall describe each component in turn and then
consider the theory as a whole.
14.2 The Eleven Primitive Acts
The theory of conceptual dependencies suggests that there are eleven 'primitive acts'.
The description 'primitive' indicates that they do not require analysis into more fundamental
actions, and they do not require explanation. These acts consist mainly of the moving about of
ideas and physical objects. The actions described by, or associated with, the use of particular
verbs are then analysed in terms of these primitive acts, and in most cases they can be shown to
be equivalent to one or more of the primitive acts, perhaps with the value of one or more of the
case-slots predefined. If the primitive acts are thought of as the 'atoms' of meaning, then the actions
associated with the verbs can be thought of as the 'molecules' of the system. The case-slots or 'dependencies'
which are associated with each verb emerge as a property conferred upon them by their 'molecular structure'.
The primitive acts each have three basic case-slots - the agent, the object and the direction. The direction
is subdivided into 'from' and 'to' case-slots. In some cases both do not apply.
Every primitive act can also be extended by adding an instrumental case which is often another primitive act.
Thus a person might INGEST a glass of milk, where the instrument is the primitive act of physically
transferring (or PTRANS-ing) the glass to his lips. In some instances we have used expressions such as 'mindof(X)'.
This is intended to indicate the conscious mind of a person or animal. The nature and number of primitive
acts described by this theory have varied over a period of years as the theory was refined, tested and modified.
A recent count places the number at eleven.

The eleven primitive acts are:
(1) MOVE
This is the movement by a person or animal of a part of its own anatomy.
That is, it moves its hand, or some other part of itself, to a new position.
The case-slots associated with this act are:
MOVE:
the agent: A
the object moved : partof(A)
the direction
where from: B
where to: C
(2) PROPEL
This is the act of causing something (other than oneself) to move to a new position. The case-slots are:
PROPEL:
the agent : A
the object propelled : B
the direction
where from : C
where to : D
the instrument : a MOVE at / another propel act / a grasp act
(3) INGEST
This is the act associated with the assimilation of food or drink. The case-slots are:
INGEST:
the agent : A
the object ingested : B
the direction
where from : C
where to : inside(A)/ mouthof(A)
the instrument: a PTRANS act
(4) EXPEL
This is the act associated with the elimination of material from the body
(e.g. blood, faeces, urine, air, etc.). The case-slots are:
EXPEL:
the agent : A
the material expelled the direction : B
where from : inside(A)
where to : C
the instrument : a PROPEL act / a MOVE act
(5) GRASP
This is the act associated with the grasping of an object in the hand, or in some other way. The case-slots are:
GRASP:
the agent : A
the object grasped : B
the direction
where from : C
where to : handof(A)
the instrument : a MOVE act
(6) ATRANS
This is the act associated with an 'abstract' transfer from one state to another.
A typical example is provided by the sale of goods from one person to another.
In some cases the object itself does not move at all (e.g. a house) but the object has been
'transferred' from the ownership of one person to the ownership of another. The case-slots are:
ATRANS
the agent : A
the object transferred: B
the direction
where from : C
where to : D
the instrument : a PTRANS act/ an MTRANS act / a MOVE act
(7) PTRANS
This is the act associated with the physical transfer of an object (including the movement of itself)
from one place to another. The case-slots are:
PTRANS:
the agent : A
the object moved : B
the direction
where from : C
where to : D
the instrument : a MOVE act / a PROPEL act
(8) SPEAK
The nature of this act is obvious from its name. The case-slots are:
SPEAK:
the agent : A
the object (thing spoken) : B
the direction
where from : A
where to : C
the instrument : a MOVE act (one's mouth)
(9) ATTEND
This act is the converse of SPEAK. It is associated with the reception of some communication. The case slots are:
ATTEND:
the agent : A
the object (sense organ) : B
the direction
where from : C
where to : A
(10) MTRANS
This is the act associated with the transfer of ideas or information from one person to another. The case-slots are:
MTRANS:
the agent : A
the object (information): B
the direction
where from (medium) : C
where to : mindof(D)
the instrument : a SPEAK act / an ATTEND act
(11) MBUILD
This act is associated with the mental construction or working out of ideas from simpler ideas
leading to decisions. The case-slots are:
MBUILD
the agent : A
the object
input : B
output : C
the direction
where from : memory(A)
where to : mindof(A)
the instrument : an MTRANS act
That completes the list of primitive acts.
14.3 Picture producers (PP)
The strange name 'picture producers' arises from the notion that many mental constructs trigger
a pictorial visualisation in our minds. A picture producer (or PP) corresponds both to the generic
concept structure which we have described in previous sections and to specific examples of these concepts.
Many nouns are associated with PPs, but not all nouns. A concept such as 'honesty' is not a PP.
(It is not clear how a concept such as 'honesty' is represented in the theory of conceptual dependencies.)
Being a concrete entity, a PP can be the agent of an act.
A PP can be implemented as a record structure or frame with slots for its properties.
These properties may be states. The idea is very similar if not identical to the object-frames
described in section 12.2.
14.4 States
A state is a condition or property of the world. Something being in a particular location is a state.
Something having a particular colour is a state. Someone being in a particular emotional condition is a state.
A state can be represented by a record structure with two elements: the name of the state (or 'state-id')
and the value (or 'state-val'). The terminology is that proposed by those who developed the theory of conceptual
dependencies (CD), but a 'state' in CD terminology appears to be identical to a 'property' which has a
'property name' and a 'property value', rather in the same way as we suggested for the dictionary structure
in section 8.5.
The record which represents a state can itself be the value of one of the properties of a
PP or one of the case-slot values of an act.
For example, to indicate that a PP has a particular location we might give it a property:
state-id = LOC (for location),
and state-val = London.
This data structure could be assigned as the slot fIller for the 'where to' case-slot of a primitive act.
The theory identifies states corresponding to (or having the property names) length, colour,
light intensity, mass and speed. It also identifies states of control, part(of), ownership, containment and proximity.
To deal with emotional states of mind, CD theory has introduced the concept of 'mental location'
(MLOC) and defines an arbitrary numeric scale of values ranging from -10 to 10 (catatonic to ecstatic).
The act of pleasing someone is therefore represented as an act which causes (DO) an increase of the
numeric value of that person's mental state (A TRANS from MLOC -1 to MLOC +1 (say).
Other mental states which also have their numeric scales of values are 'anger', 'fear', 'disgust' and
'surprise'. The theory also includes states such as 'health', 'hunger', consciousness' and several others.
The arbitrary nature of these states and their numeric scales of values is one of the most unsatisfactory
aspects of the theory, but at least it represents an attempt to tackle these problems in a fairly direct way.
14.5 Implementation: from Input Text to Conceptualisation
Various mechanisms for getting from the original input text to the internal representation (or conceptualisation) have been tried. Some have used special parsers and others have abandoned the process of parsing altogether. We shall describe one possible method in outline only.
The basic data structures are:
(1) INLIST: the input text.
(2) CST ACK: a stack of conceptualisations. It is initially empty.
(3) RSTACK: a stack of 'requests'. The RSTACK is also initially empty.
(4) LEXICON: a list of all the words which the system can handle.
Each word is associated with a PACKET.
(5) PACKETS: a set of requests.
(6) REQUEST: a demon, or function (see section 12.3) which can be stored
and fired when required. A request has the form:
TEST: a condition which must be true for the request to be granted;
ASSIGN: a set of variables and values. If the request is granted
the values are assigned to these variables;
NEXT-PACKET: a list offurther requests, which are loaded
if the first request is granted (and after the
assignment of the variable values).
The text-processing algorithm is as follows:
while inlist is not empty
Remove the first word of inlist and assign it to x.
Look up x in the lexicon, extract its packet and
place the packet on RSTACK, while (RSTACK is not empty)
and
(there is a request there which can be fired)
Look for a request with test-condition = true;
if found then
assign the variable values
and carry out any other actions requested
remove the packet from RSTACK
add its next-packets to RSTACK endwhile;
endwhile;
Note that in carrying out the actions indicated by the request, the system may place a
conceptual dependency structure on the CSTACK. It can also access and modify the values
assigned to the variables within conceptual dependencies already on the CSTACK.
The CSTACK therefore provides a mechanism for
communication between processing handling different parts of a statement the same
facilities provided by the side-effects of our ATN processing technique.
When processing is completed, the contents of the CST ACK will represent
the meaning of the statement.
The real work of the process (analogous to the side-effects of our ATN processing)
is therefore carried out by the requests, which vary from word to word in the lexicon
(just as the side-effects varied from arc to arc of the ATN).
An example of the packet associated with the word 'went'
(adapted from Inside Computer Understanding by Schank and Riesbeck) is shown below.
Govarl, go-var2 and go-var3 are local variables (within PTRANS).
Part-of-speech, subject and conceptual-dep are global variables which are updated as processing
is carried out. The variable conceptual-dep is always set equal to the most recent
conceptual dependency analysed.
PACKET for "WENT"
------------------(start of "went")
TEST: --
ASSIGN:
part-of-speech := verb
conceptual-dep := PTRANS
agent := go-varl
object:= go-varl
to := go-var2
from := go-var3
go-varl := subject
go-var2 := nil
go-var3 := nil
NEXT-PACKET
-----------------(start of "to")
TEST (next-word = "to")
ASSIGN: ---
NEXT-PACKET
------------------(start of "np")
TEST: (part-of-speech = np) ASSIGN:
go-var2 := conceptual-dep
TEST: (next-word = "home")
ASSIGN: go-var2 := "house".
------------------( end of "np")
------------------(end of "to")
--------------------( end of "went")
Note that this could be translated into the program:
define went;
part-of-speech := "verb";
v1 := subject;
v2 := nil;
v3 := nil;
conceptual-dep := PTRANS(vl,vl,v2,v3); *
if next-word(inlist) = "to" then
*
if part-of-speech = np then
v2 := conceptual-dep; **
endif;
else
if next-word(inlist) = "home"
v2 := "house";
endif;
endif;
enddefine;
At the points marked ,*, the program is entering a new 'request'.
At the point marked ,**, the value of the conceptual-dependency which is assigned
to v2 is the conceptual dependency belonging to the noun phrase (np).
The way this system behaves is complex and difficult to understand because of the
number of variables, and the way these are updated at different times by procedures
which are themselves dependent upon the other words in the sentence being processed.
It is important to note, however, that the idea of a parser has almost vanished from the system.
Syntactical information is embedded in the packet associated with each word. Each 'knows' what
words and syntactical structures to expect in its immediate vicinity, and provides the system
with this local information as it is required. Note that the series of packets given in the
illustration are testing for two possible sequences of words:
went to (somewhere)
went home
The tests involved in the 'requests' correspond logically to the tests carried out in
an ATN before deciding which arc should be followed. The updates of the variables correspond
to the side-effects generated when an arc is traced.
14.6 The 'DO' Act
To the eleven primitive acts is added a twelfth general purpose act called DO.
It simply means 'to cause something to happen' and is often used in conjunction
with the primitive acts by making one of these fill its object case-slot. That is -
DO
the agent : A
the object : another act or a state
the instrument : a MOVE act, a PTRANS, etc.
14.7 Tense in Conceptual Dependencies
To simplify things we have omitted any mention of tense.
The conceptualisation structure can be extended to include additional case-slots,
one of which would be a tense parameter. The requests associated with the package
for any given verb can include a request to insert an appropriate tense value.
14.8 Examples of Conceptual Dependencies
In section 14.5 we provided an example of the 'package' which is used for the verb 'went'.
This package creates and places in the CSTACK a conceptualisation with the structure
PTRANS(agent,object,from,to), so that the representation of the sentence 'John went to London'
would be:
PTRANS
agent=John
object=John
from= ?
to=London
We also stated in section 14.1 that the basic idea in CD theory is to interpret the meaning
of verbs (and other words) in terms ofthe primitive objects (PPs), acts and states.
To illustrate this we provide below some examples of sentences and their interpretation
in these terms. Most are adapted from examples given by Schank and Riesbeck.
(a) John took a plane to London
PTRANS
agent = John
object = John
from = ?
to = London
instrument =
PROPEL
agent = plane
object = plane
from = ?
to = London
and
PTRANS
agent = John
object = John
from = ?
to = plane
(i.e. John went to London by placing himself on a plane which propelled itself to London)
(b) John drank a glass of milk
INGEST
agent = John
object = milk
from = glass
to = mouth of John
instrument =
PTRANS
agent = John
object = glass
from = table
to = mouth of John
instrument =
MOVE
agent = John
object = hand of John
from = ?
to = glass
and
GRASP
agent = John
object = glass
from = ?
to = hand of John
(ie. John drank a glass of milk by moving the glass to his mouth by moving his hand to the glass and grasping the glass)
The reader will recognise the alarming complexity of this structure, and the fact that some additional instrumental
or intermediate acts have been omitted. For example, after grasping the glass and moving his hand to his mouth
(thus transporting the glass to his mouth) John tipped the glass so that the milk flowed into his mouth,
and then he swallowed...etc.
(c) John decided to go to London
MBUILD
agent = John
object
input = ?
output = PTRANS
agent = John
object = John
from = ?
to = London
from = memory
to = conscious mind
(d) John told Mary the story
MTRANS
agent = John
object = story
from = John
to = Mary
instrument =
SPEAK
agent = John
object = story
from = mind of John
to =?
and
ATTEND
agent = Mary object = ears
from = John
to = mind of Mary
14.9 Some Thoughts on CD Theory
It is easy to be critical of CD theory. The description provided here is necessarily brief and inadequate.
It is intended only to give a flavour of the system, and does not do justice to the very real success which
the approach has achieved in
producing, for example, good paraphrases of the input text. It is not recommended, however, that the reader
try to reproduce a working system for CD theory.
The criticisms which have been levelled at CD theory tend to be generated by a distaste for the clumsy
representations it produces and the almost complete absence of mathematical elegance.
Two things need to be said in its defence, however. Firstly it represents a frontal attack on the real problem of NL
processing. It asks the right questions of itself. It tries to produce a representation of the actual meaning
of a statement. It recognises the importance of motivation (or 'mental states'). It recognises that events
are linked causally and can be chained together to produce an overall result. Secondly by demonstrating its
own limitations it has drawn attention to the need for contextual information and knowledge about the knowledge of others.
When the system was put through its paces and was asked questions about the sentences it was processing, it tended
to give answers which were much more detailed than a human would give. For example, if such a system processed the
statement 'John fell in the water and was drowned', and was then asked why John died, it tended to give a string of
answers such as:
because he could not breath
because his air supply was blocked
because his mouth was under water because he was immersed in water
and
because he could not float
and
because the water was deeper than his height because ...
In other words it would print a very detailed list of cause and effect in terms of primitive acts.
A human, on the other hand, would know that the list was of little interest to another human,
because it was common knowledge. The interesting
information is that which cannot be assumed to be common knowledge - that John fell in the water.
The rest can be taken for granted. This clearly points up the need for an NL processing system to
have some idea of what others (as well as itself) know about.
It is suggested that we should ignore the clumsy notation and terminology and the crude numerical
scale representing mental states and the like. Whatever method we use to represent the meaning of a
statement, it will require a notation or symbolism of some kind. What form it takes is of less
importance than the things it attempts to represent. The important aspect of CD theory is the
fact that it tackles the representation of the important factors, and correctly relegates
syntactical analysis to the role of an aid in the achievement of understanding.
The function of language is, after all, to transmit understanding from one person to another.
The grammatical elegance of our words (or lack of it) is of secondary importance.